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Introduction
Plarntiff's counsel is always
relieved to obtain the auto policy
declarations page and find adequate,
i.e., 100,000/300,000 limits of Bodily
Injury, Uninsured Motorist, and
Underinsured Mototist covetage fot
coverage of the claimant's injuries.
However, it is becoming more common
to then discovet that a clause in the
policy or endotsement reduces those
limits to a statutory minimum $25,000
fot the "named insuted" ot "famJly
member." Or, the clause reduces the
tortfeasor's insurance to the statutoty
minimum because he was a non-family
petmissive uset. This article addresses
the increasingly occurring situations
where such "step-down" clauses
are insetted to defeat covetage for
particuìar classes of clajmants.
A "step-down" clause in an auto
insutance policy reduces the declaration
pâge âmounts to a certain minimum
coverage when the claimant or the
drivet is a member of cettain de{ined
classes. The two common classes of
persons identified to suffer reduction
of benefits ate (1) the "named insured
and any family member," (what the
âuthor will call the "family'' step-
down), and Q) "a person other than
the named ìnsuted ot family members,"
(what the authot will call the "permis-
sive user" step-down). Flence, the frst
is used to teduce coverage benefìts to
farntly, and the other, itonically, to
reduce coveÍâge benefìts to non-family.
Bacþround of the clauses that
step-down benefits to family
These two types of step-down
clauses have very different rationales
for their inclusion in the policies. The
first has its roots i¡ tort pdnciples of
family immunity. Historically, the
common law enforced an immunity
between spouses and also parental
immunity from suits by children.2 The
immunities were based on the idea that
such suits v¡ould be fìctitious ancl
fraudulent and disrupt peace and har-
mony in the home.3 Most states have
now tejected those rationalizations and
abolished the immunities.a Montana
abtogated tort immunity between
spouses inMiller a. Fallon County n
1986,5 noting that the ptesence of
insurance would ptevent lamily hat
mony ftom being desttoyed. In
Transamericø Ins. Co. o. Royle n
1983,6 the Montana Supreme Court
abrogated intra-family tort immuniry
holding that 
^ 
pzrent was not immune
from suit by a child in patt because of
the "ptevalence of insurance."
This was no consolation to
insurers more worried than ever about
the prospect of collusion between
family members. Consequentl¡ the
industry protected itself ftom the
perceived thteat by use of "famt7:/' or
"household" exclusions that appear tn
the forms used for property/casualty
coverage in the United States. Family
ot household exclusions were and are
desþed to block any recovery fot
family membets by simply excluding
coverage. Arguably, they are simply
family tort immunity resurrected.
The reader is referred to the author's
previous articles about family exclu-
sionsT and invalidating such exclusionss
For treatment of family and household
exclusions in general.
Bacþround of the clauses that
step-down benefits to perrnissive
usefs
The second type of step-down
clause teduces liability coverage for
permissive drivers other than family
members. The author will call it the
"permissive driver" step-down clause.
Its genesis is quite diffetent ftom
that for family members. \Øhen auto
insurers accept an application from a
family, they have â certâin âmount of
underwriting information on each
family ddvet, i.e., accident experience,
licensing, age, ttaffic violations, vision,
disabilities, and even school grades.
This information assists the catrier in
assessing and allocating risk to the
appropdate risk pool. The insurer has
no such underwriting information on
permissive users "other than the nâmed
insured and family members."
Moreoveq auto liability insurers
have had to deal with a wave of court
decisions extending to all classes of
petmissive users coverâge under the
"omnibus clause," (the clause that
extends covetage to dtivers operât-
ing the vehicle with the owner's
permission).e The courts were swayed
by mandatoty omnibus clause statutes,
which they viewed âs supporting (<a
strong pubJic policy of providing
compensation to accident victims."1o
Obviously, the insuter would üke
to exclude coverage for the class of
petmissive usets othet than the named
insured and family members. However,
family exclusions and permissive user
exclusions each run afoul of state
statutes mandating insurance coverâge.
Essentially, if a statute mandates that
a particular coverage be carried, i.e.,
Bodily tnjury Liabilìty coverage in
Montanall or that it be offered, i.e.,
Uninsured Motorist coverage in
Montana,12 an insurance provision
that excludes a class of persons from
coverage by the terms of the policy in
derogation of the stâtute, is likeþ void
as against public policy. Hence, In
Transømerica Ins. Co. t:. Royle n
1,983,13 the Montana Supreme Court
declared the family exclusion invalid on
the gtound that the Mandatory Liability
Ptotection Act required insurance
against bodily injury to "any person"
and made no exceptìon fot bodily
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injury to family members. Said the
court, "The legislature has expressly
outlawed the'household exclusion."'14
The outright exclusion of liability
coverage fot a permissive uset fairs no
better. In Suanh a. Cbrysler Ins.
Corp. n (1997),1s a gara;ge policy of
an 
^trto 
dealer excluded the dealer's
permissive users (its customers using
loanet cars) from liability coverage
except insofat as they didn't have pet-
sonal covetage that met the mandatory
minimum lirnits undet state statute.
The court held that the provision ex-
cluding coverage of customefs v/ho
had their own coverage was void be-
cause it didn't meet the mandatory
minimum coverâge for "a)1. vehicles
owned or operated" in Montana.l6
To avoid having exclusions stricken
for violating public policy, insurers
desþed step-down clauses that only
excluded coverage in excess of the
statutoty minimums. Flence, instead of
excluding coverage for farnly membets
ot permissive users, the step-down
clauses would reduce their coverage to
the state stâtutory minimum limits of
the respective coverâge.
Examples of the step-down clause
limiting family member recovery to
minimum limits
The Montana Federal Disttict
Court's decision n Sbook e, Stdte
Førm Mutual ins. Co.n (1.994)
involved a step-down clause that lim-
ited tecovery for a farnly or household
member under the Bodily Injury Liabil-
ity coverage to minimum stâtutory
limits:
Thete is no coverâge: 2:For any
bodily injuty to: c. Any insured
ot any member of the insured's
family residing in the insured's
household to the extent the lim-
its of liabiliry of this policy ex-
ceed the limits of liabiliry
required by law.
In New Mexico's case of
Mørtinez a. Allstate Ins. Co. ('1997,18
Allstate's policy excluded ftom Bodily
Inlury Liability coverage for:
bodily injury to any person
telated to an insured person
by blood, mârriage or adoption
and residing in that petson's
household, to the extent that the
Iirnits of liability for this cover-
age exceeds the limits of Jìability
required by the [name of state]
Financial Responsibility lavr
In the Nev¡ Mexico decision of
State Farm Mutwal Autornobile
Insurønce Company v,
B allørd,le (2002), the step-down
exclusion for family makes clear its
direct connection with intra-famital
immunity in tort:
THERE IS NO COVE,RÂGE,:
***
2. FOR ANY BODILY IN-
JURY TO:
c. ANY INSURED OR ANY
MEMBER OF AN NSURE,D'S
FAMILY RESIDING IN THE
INSURE,D'S HOUSEHOLD:
(1) rF TNTRA.-FAMrLrÁ.L
TORT IMMUNITY ÂPPLIES;
OR
Q) TO THE EXTENT THE,
LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF
THIS COVER,A.GE EXCEED
THE LIMITS OF LIÂBILITY
RE,QUiRED BY I-Aìü IF
INTRO FAMILIAL TORT
IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY
Ptogtessive Casualty Insurance
Companyt family step-down clause in
the BI liability coverâge to the mini-
mum has been tailored in an attempt to
avoid having it found ambiguous after
the Montana Supteme Court decisions
in Liebrønd ø. Nøtionøl Farmers
Union Property and Casualty Co.,
and Cole o. Trwck Ins, Excbønge:2o
NO COVE,RAGE IS PRO-
VIDED UNDER THIS PART I
FOR BODILY INJURY TO
YOU ORA REI-ATIVE FOR
THE PORTION OF DÁ.M_
ÂGES THAT EXCEEDS THE
MINIMUM LIMITS OF LI-
ABILITY CO\¡E,RAGE R-E_
QUIRED BY THE
MÄNDATORY MOTOR VE-
I{ICLE LIABILITY INSUR-
ÂNCE I,\W OF THE STATE
OF MONTANA, PURSUANT
TO MT. CODE S 61-6-301
AND $ ó1-6-103, AS
AMENDED O4INIMUM RE_
QUIRED LIMITS ÂRE CUR-
RE,NTLY $25,OOO EACH
PE,RSON FOR BODILY
TNJURY/$50,000 EÂCH
ACCIDENT FOR BODILY
TNJURY.'1
US,{,As auto policy form 5100MT
(1999) contains the following family
step-dovm clause in the BI coverage:
C. There is no coverage fot BI
for which a covered person
becomes legally tesponsible to
pay a member of that coveted
personts household. This ex-
clusion applies only to the extent
that the limits of liability for this
coverâge exceed $25,000 for
each person or $50,000 for each
accident.
Examples of step-down clauses
limiting permissive users' tecovery
to minimum limits
Generally, the permissive user
step-dovm clauses limit liability covet-
age to à specified âmount (ess than
what is shown on the declarations
page) or to the minimum ptescdbed by
the state's flnancial responsib.ilty laws.22
In the Missouri case of 'Windsor Ins,
Co. o. Lucas, 23 (2000) the policy
de{ìned an "insured" in the liability
portion of the policy as:
"insured(s)" meâns. . . . [a] per-
son using your insured car with
your permission. The limits of
liabüity for a permìssive user
will be equal to minimum limits
of liabiJity specified by the
I
i
I
I
i
I
I
I
I
I
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Financial ResponsibiTty Law of the state in which the
accident occurs.
This clause was coupled with a "Limits of Liabilty-Part
A only'' clause that read:
Regardless of the limits of liability shown on the Dec-
larations page the bodily injury and properry damage
JiabiJity. . . for each insured, other than you and a rela-
tive, will equal the limits of the Financial Responsibility
Law of the state in which the ¿ccident occurred.
In 2006, District Judge Holly Brown (Gallatin Counry)
voided a step-down clause aimed at permissive users in Mid-
Century Insurance Company's auto liability pohcy.za That
policy used a standard insuting agteement and limits of liabil-
ity clause with a declarat-ions page that showed no evidence of
the step-down clause. The step-down clause fust appeared in
the company's "Othet Insutance" ptovision:
\Øe will ptovide insurance for an insuted petson,
other than you or a farnrly membet, up to the lirnits
of the Financial Responsibility Law on1y.
The policy also contained an Âmendatory Endorsement
which provided:
We will provide insutance fot an insured person,
othet than you, a family member or a listed drivet,
but only up to the minimum required limits of your
state's Financial Responsibility Law of $25,000 per
person and $50,000 per occrürence for bodily
injury, and $10,000 for property damage.
Treatment of step-down clauses fot petmissive users
The "vast malotity" of courts do not treat permissive
user step-down clauses as illegal.2s The coutts find support
for the clauses in patties'fteedom to conttact and on the
fact that the clauses still ptovide minimum limits in compli-
ance v¡ith the law 2á Insurance scholar, ProfessorJohnny
Parker, âsserts that, in all but two jurisdictions, "step-down
provisions do not violate public policy as long as they pto-
vide the minimum limits of coverage tequited by lav,r."21
Insurers' argument that the permissive users present ân
unknown and unpredictable risk may be persuasive fot the
courts. It would seem easier to attack the step-down clauses
aimed at family members than permissive users.
Nevertheless, Judge Brown tuled a step-down provi-
sion aimed at petmissive usets void for ambiguity, lack of
conspicuousness, violation of pubJic policy, unconscionabil-
ity, and violation of teasonable expectations.2s MTI-A mem-
ber, Dan Buckley, presented the challenge to the clâuse.
Montana treatment of the step-down clauses
Judge Hatfield of the United States District Court for
Montana made the eâdjest pronouncements regârding per-
missive uset step-down clauses rn Guaranty Nationøl
Insurance Company v. Kemper Finøncial Serzsices
tn 1987.2e There, a rcntal c r agency carried a policy that
covered it for Jiability with limits of $1,000,000 but only
covered its rental customers for the minimum limits re-
quired undet Montana lav¡. Robison, an employee of
I(empet Financial Services, rented àn avto and was involved
in a collision causing injury to third persons. I(emper and
Robison asserted that Guatanfi ov¡ed the $1,000,000 limit
avatlable to the named insured as opposed to the $25,000
limit available under the step-down ptovisions of the
agreement. They argued that the step-down aspect violated
Montana public policy and that the insuring agteement
was ambþous. Judge Hatfìeld rejected both arguments.
I(empet and Robison relied upon the Montana
Supreme Court's 1983 decision 'n Bill Atkinson
Volkswagen, Inc,30 involving 
^ 
g f^ge policy that covered
the named insured but excluded its customers using loaner
cars to the extent they had their own liability insurance. The
court had ruled that such an exclusion was void as violat-ive
of the Montana Mandatory Liability Protection ,\ct, $ 61-6-
301, et. nq. Judge Hatfìeld, however, distinguished between
the policy that excludes coverâge for the permissive user
and one that teduces coverâge to amounts tequired by
Montana lav¿ He noted that the Motor Vehicle Safety
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Responsibility Act, $ 61-6-103(8),
MCÂ (1985) ptovided:
(8) Any policy which grants the
coverâge requìred for a motor
vehicle liabiJity policy may also
grant âny lawful coverage in
excess of or in addition to the
coverâge specified fot a motor
vehicle liability policy and such
excess or additional coverâge
shall not be subject to the provi-
sion of this pârt. With tespect
to a poìicy which grants such
excess or additional coverâge
the terms "motor vehicle liabil-
ity policy" shall apply only to
thatpart of the coverage which
is tequired by this section.
Said Hatfìeld, "This court views
subsection (8) as exptessly sanctioning
coverâge beyond the statutory mini-
mum requfuements for any particular
insured under the policy." 31 He found
the public concern to be satisfied when
one purchased insurance in amounts
required by the Acl 32
The Missouri case of Gabriel a.
Sheher Mut, fns. Co.,33 is in accord
wtú Kemper. Therc, the court noted
that the Motot Vehicle Financial Re-
sponsibility Law in Missouri permitted
coverage in excess of the minimums
and provided that "such excess or
additional coverage shall not be subject
to the ptovisions of this chapter."
Montana's Motor Vehicle Safety Re-
sponsibility Act, MCA$ 61-6-103(8),
contains the identical quoted language.
This makes it harder to 
^tgûe thatMontana's Mandatory Liability
Protection Act, which refers to provi-
sions of the Motot Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Law, invalidates the
family exclusion for âmounts over
the minimums.3a
Howevet, insutance consumet
counsel should keep three aspects of
Kemper in mind: Fust, Kemper n-
volved a step-down clause for permis-
sive users distinguishing it from cases
considering step-down clauses reducing
coverâge for family members, It is
easier to 
^tt^ck 
the family step-down
clause because its application seems so
arbitary and unfair as to make it vul-
netable to public policy attacks as well
as attacks based upon the reasonable
expectations of the insured.
Second, we should note thât
Kemper involved a cat rcntd agency,
which would likely be deemed to be a
soptristicated buyer of auto insurance
that would fully appreciate, and pet-
haps request, a step-down provision
that would allow it to meet the lav¡
whjle providing its customeÍs the mini-
mum limits fot purposes of saving
ptemium. It is equally likely that the
personal purchaser of auto insurance
does not understand or request step-
down clauses in an auto polic¡ may not
be getting any premium bteak as a
result of the clauses, and would not
elect them if they were negotiable.
Thrd, Kemper is a federal deci-
sion made before the Montana
Supreme Court had addressed step-
down provisions. Âs will be seen below
n Liebrand a. Nøtional Farmers
Union Property and Casualty Co.,
and Cole o. Trwck Ins. Excbange,3s
the Montana Supteme Court appears to
be hostile to the step-down provisions
àtleast insofar as the step-down is
artrned at reducing family benefits.
Nonetheless, step-down provisions
appeated to receive the Montana Su-
preme Court's blessing (in dìcta) n a
case that did not i¡volve a step-down
clause in 1988. In lowa Mwt. Ins. Co.
zs, Ddaisr36 the court held a "named-
clriver" exclusion void as against public
policy for violating the Mandatory
Liability Insurance Act, $ 61-6-301
(since amended to expressly allow
named-drivet exclusions). Davises had
requested to exclude their teenage sons
ftom their policy to avoid high premi-
ums from the dsk they presented.
However, in voiding the named insured
exclusion in that case, the court said:
Our ruling does not, however,
prohibit an i¡surer from entet-
ing into âgreements with their
insureds to limit coverâge to the
statutory mltrmum amounts âs
set forth in $61-6-103, MCA.
Othet states have teached
similar conclusions.
Arguably, the coutt v¡âs âuthoriz-
ing the insuted and the insuter to âgfee
that a specified named-insured could be
excluded from excess coverage. How-
ever, insurets would read the statement
as blanket authorization for step-down
clauses.
Accordingly, in the 1994 Federal
case of Sbook ú. State Førtn Mut.
Ins.,31 Jtdge Hatfìeld addressed a
family step-down clause in the Bodily
Injuty "Coverage N'of State Farm's
poJicy that read:
Thete is no coverage: * * * 2.
For any Bodiþ Injury to: ...( c)
an1 invred or any member of
an insared's family residing in the
insared'¡ household to the extent
the limits of liability of this
policy exceed the limits of
liability required by law.
Shooks carried BI Limits of
$100,000, but when the wife sued het
husband for personal injuty negligence,
State Farm tendered only $25,000.
Judge Hatfield held that"an exclusion-
aty endorsement which operates to
lirnit coverage to the statutory mini-
mum amourìts established by Mont.
Code ,A.nn. S 61-6-301 is not violative
oÊ the public policy inherent in
Montana's mandatoty insutance law:"
However, he found the positioning of
the exclusion ìn relation to the broad
language of the basic coverage agree-
ment created an ambþity and violated
the teasonable expectations of the
insured.
Soon after Sbook in 1995, the
Montana Supreme Court, on certifìed
questions from the Federal District
Court, decided the companion cases
of Liebrand v. Nationøl Farmers
Union Property dnd Casualty Co.,
and Cole e, Truck Ins. Excbange.3s
In each case, famly members had been
precluded ftom full liability coverage by
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step-dovm clauses in that coverage.
NFU's $100,000 liabiìity coverage in
Liebrand excluded "bodily injury to
you or any telative to the extent the
limits of liabiliry of this policy exceed
the limits of liability required by law."
Liebrandb declarations page stated
that, "fiiabiJity pâyments to household
members are limited to the Financial
Responsibility limits of the policy stâte."
Coles carried liability limits of
$500,000 under covetage that con-
tained a step-down clause precluding
coverâge, "Atising out of the liability
of any insured for bodily injuty to you
or a famtly member to the extent the
lirnits of liability of this policy exceed
the Limits of liability tequired by law"
T.LE.t declarations pâge gave no
notice of the limitation of tecovety
by family members and showed a
$500,000 Lirnit for bodily injuty and
property damage Jiability.
The court appJied the test from
Shook, that determination of whether
there is ambiguity tequires anaþsis of the
language of the poìicy "utilzed &om the
viewpoint of a consumer ol average
intelligence, not trained in the law or in
the insurance busìness."3e The coutt
found that, for people untrained in the
law and of average j¡¡slligence, the
poJicy language provided no means by
which the insured could know the limit
of liabiJity avilal¡Ie when a family mem-
ber was the injured claimant. Accotd-
ingly, the step-dovn provisions in each
câse were held to be "unclear and am-
bþous," and declared invalid and unen-
forceable. The court declined to rule on
whether the clauses violated the insureds'
teasonable expectations or.v/ere void as
contrary to public policy of the state.
Most importantly, the court
watned that attempts to clarify the
step-dovrn provisions would tesult in a
fìnding of unconscionability because
the clauses arc inserted in contracts
of adhesion and aú:irtanTy exclude a
whole class of insuteds ftom full cover-
age in a market where they cânnot
obtain that coverage.
In 2005, Montana District Court
Judge Tom Mcl{ittrick in the Eighth
Judicial District refused to enforce
family step-down clauses in the liabilìty
coverage of USAA auto policy fot
failure to comply with the notice provi-
sions of 533-15-1106.a0 Though he
disposed of the case on failure of
notice grounds, he expressly found that
the clause, appearing in a contract of
adhesion, was also unconscionable and
void as against public policy. MTL\
member, Chadie Lucero wrote a com-
ptehensive bdef attacking the clause
on several grounds.
Methods of attacking step-down
clauses
A. Invalidity for violating statute
The fact that a step-down clause
does not violate a statute setting mân-
datoty minimum limits does not pre-
clude a challenge fot violation of
another stâtute. Fot instance, clauses
limiting coverage to the minimum
requìred by the fìnancial responsibility
laws arguably violate insurance code
provisions forbidding reference to
othet provisions. In Montana,
S 33-15-302 requires that "the policy
when issued shall contain the entire
contrâct between the parties" and there
cannot be "any agreement as to the
insutance which is not plainly ex-
pressed in the policy." Also, S 33-15-
316 provides that "Every insurance
contract shall be construed according
to the entiety of its terms and condi-
tions as set forth in the policy and as
amplified, extended, or modifìed by any
rider, endorsemerìt, ot application
which is a part of the policy." As the
Montana Supreme Court pointed out in
rhe Liebrand and Cole cases, an in-
suted unschooled in the law cannot tell
by looking at his or het policy how
much covetage it affotds family mem-
bers if â step-dovm clause reduces the
family member's limit to that set by
"financial responsibility laws" as op-
posed to the dollar limit appearing on
the declatations page.
Section 61,-6-1,03(4) requires that
'1\ motor vehicle liability policy must
state the name and address of the
named insured, the coverage afforded
by the policy, the premium charged
therefote, the policy period, and the
limits of liability and contain 
^n ^gree-
ment or be enforced that insurance is
provided thereunder in accotdance
with the coverâge defined in this part
âs respects bodily injury and death or
propetty damage, or both, and is sub-
ject to all the provisions of this part."
Does a step-dov/n clause simply refet-
ring to the Financial Responsibility Act
stâte the "coverâge afforded" and the
"limits of Jiabilty?"
The South Dakota Supteme Coutt
invalidated a step-down clause fot
permissive usets because it constituted
a "resttictive endorsement" which,
undet the South Dakota Insutance
Code, was tequired to appeat on a
separate page attached to the policy
instead of in the body of the policy
itseK. Mid-Century Insurance Corn-
pdny u. Lyon, (1.997).41 Montana does
not appear to have a similar require-
ment for restrictive endotsements other
than, under S 33-15-316, tefetence to
endorsements must aPPe f on the
declarations page as pafi of the policy.
\Øhen a step-down clause is in-
setted into the policy by tenewal ot àny
type of endorsement, it is subject to
statutofy notice requirements as â
condition to enforcement because the
policy is cleatþ being tenewed on "less
favorable terms." Section 33-L5-1106,
MC,A. provides fot statutory notice of
changes on renewal:
Renewal with altered terms. (1)
If an insuter offets or purports
to renev/ a policy on less favor-
able terms, at atigher Î^te, ot at
a higher rating plan, the new
tefms, râte, or ratìng plan take
effect on the policy renewal date
only if the insuter has mailed or
delivered notice of the new
tefms, rate, ot rating plan to the
insure at least 30 days before the
expiration date.
Judge Mcl(ttrick in the Eighth
Judicial Distrìct recently refused to
enforce family step-down clauses in the
I
t
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Jiability coverage of the USAA auto
polìcy for failure to comply with the
notice provisions of S 33-15-1106.
In Sheher MutuøI Insurance
Company o. Mid-Century Insurance
Company,az the Colorado court re-
fused to enfotce a step-down clause
aimed at a petmissive user on the
ground that information given on
renewal did not constitute an adequate
notice to the insured that his insurance
had been substantially teduced. The
questions for counsel ate whether
the company gave notice and whether
the information given is sufficient to
constitute notice.
The Appellate Division of the
Superior Court of New Jersey ruled
notice inadequate tn Skeete a,
Doraius,a3 Q00 4), whete Prudential
sent the insuted some 200 pages of
renewal documents ìn two weeks. The
documents contained a handful of
unremarkable paragraphs noting the
step-down provisions but made no
mention of them on the new declara-
tions page. The court refused to
enfotce the step-down clause.
B. Invalidity for violation of
public policy aside ftom the statute
Statutes aside, a step-do\¡r'n clause
can be stricken if it violates judicially
stated pubJic pohcy. Tissell a. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co,4 SX/ash, 1990). In
Tissell, the coutt invalidated a famtly
exclusion clause in UIM coverage while
stating some important principles. The
court sâid:
,\n insurer is free to limit its
tìsks by excluding coverage
when the nature of its risk is
altered by factors rìot contem-
plated by it in computing premi-
ums, such as the use of a vehicle
by an unauthodzed driver. The
famly or household exclusion,
by contrast, is directed at a class
of innocent victims who have
no control over the vehicle's
operation and who cânnot be
said to increase the natute of
the insurer's risk. A.n exclusion
which denies coverage when
certain victims ate injured is
violative of public policy.
x x x Since the fact that the vic-
tim is a member of the insured's
family does not subiect the in-
surer to an indeterminate risk,
the insurer is able to calculate
an apptopriate ptemium and
the general poJicy of full com-
pensation for accident victims
still applies
One of the most cogent and
simple fotmulations of hov¡ the
family step-down clause violates pubJic
policy was atticulated by the Supteme
Court of New Mexico n Støte Førm
Mutual Auto Insurønce Company a.
Ballard,132 N.M. 696,54 P.3d 537
(2002). The court found invalid the
family exclusion that teduced to mini-
mum liability limits family recovery for
a mother and two children grievously
injuted in a single car collision caused
by negligence of the drivet. The court
rejected the premise that the only
pubJic policy involved was that re-
flected in the New Mexico Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibiïty Âct.
The court instead applied the public
policy of protecting innocent accident
victims. The coutt noted that it had
rejected intra-famiïal tort immuûity
and assetted that famiral exclusions are
an anachronism, "because the reasons
for the rule are no longet valid." The
court also rejected the fteedom of
conttact ârgument since insurance
contfacts âfe fìot the result of any
conscious bargaining on the pan of
the insured. The court bluntly assetted
that Carcil Ballard did not purchase
minimum limits but, rather, purchased
100/300 limits of liability insurance. It
concluded that, while the step-down
clause may not violate the policy under-
þing the minimum limits of New
Mexico's Financial Responsibility Act,
it violates the principle of protecting
the innocent victims of auto accidents.
The coutt quoted its decision in Estep
ø. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,as
where it said:
Since a wife in this jurisdiction
has a cause of action for injuries
suffered because of her
husband's negligence, it is diffi-
cult to discetn how a fundamen-
tal public poJicy putpose of the
Financial Responsibility Act, i.e.,
to provide fìnancial protection
to those who sustain injury
thtough the negligence of mo-
tor vehicle owners or opeÍators-
is served, or how the require-
ment of the Àct, i.e., to provide
proof of financial responsibìIty
fot losses from liability imposed
by law which arise from the use
of an insured motor vehicle - is
observed, when the family ex-
clusion clause in the policy spe-
cifically carves out from
correrâge a considerable seg-
ment of the class of individuals
the NMMFR.A. is desþed to
Pfotect.
Ultimately, the New Mexico court
held that family exclusion provisions
limiting benefìts "based on famiïal
stâtlrs, violate pubJic policy and
fundamental ptinciples of fairness."
Another court seems to take the
position that permissive user step-
down clauses ate against public policy
solely on the gtound that, "if an insut-
ance company offers covetage above
the starutory minimums, it cannot
selectiveþ restrict those limjts based on
who was driving the automobile."
Home Insurdnce Co, a, McGoaern,
(E.D.Pa. 1.993).46 The public policy
there was apparently based in â statute
that ptohibited an insured from pur-
chasing gte ter limits of UM/UiM
coverage than BI coverage. Montana
has no such statute, but the author
believes that insurets in Montana will
not sell insureds gte ter UM/UIM
than the BI they purchase.
Süe should note that, tn Stutzman
a. Søfeco Ins, Co¡q the court upheld
a fanlly exclusion in Underinsuted
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Motorist coverage. There, the defini-
tion of "underinsured motor vehicle"
provìded:48
But undetinsured motot vehicle
does not include âny motor
vehicle: ...(3) owned by or fut-
nished fot the regular use of the
named insured ot 
^ny 
relative...
Stutzman was suing her husband,
John Turcotte, for damages she suffered
arising from his negligence in operating
a motor vehicle in which she was a
passenger. She cited Transamerica o.
Royle for the proposition that the
family exclusion was invalid as violative
of pubJic poJicy in Montana. Flowever,
the court refused to invalidate the fam-
ily exclusion for underinsured motorist
coverâge on the ground that "there is
no stâtutory mandate for underinsured
motorist coverâge in Montana."
Stutzman also argued that the house-
hold exclusion to UIM coverâge wâs
unconscionable because it prohibited
her ftom recovering the UIM benefit
solely because it was het husband who
injured her (as opposed to a thìrd
patq). The court disagreed saying that
she had the "meaningfrrl choice" of
purchasing additional liability insurance.
To rule otherwise, the court said, would
be to convert the UIM coverage into
liability coverâge, a step the court was
unwilling to force on insurers.
UIM coverage is not the subject of
âny statutory mandate in Montana.
Consequently, if a farrtùy or household
exclusion defeats the coverage, counsel
has no UIM statute to use as a basis for
a chalienge of violation of public
policy. Howevet, othet provisions de-
feating undetinsured mototist coverage
have been successfully attacked on
other public policy grounds that may
apply. For exâmple, n Bennett 7). State
Farm Mut. Auto; Ins. Co.ae (1993),
the court invalidated an "other insur-
ance" clause that would have prevented
the stacking of a husband and wife's
respective limits of UIM coverâge
on their two cars. The court said:
The public poìicy embodied
in these decisions is that an
insuret may not place in an in-
surânce policy a ptovision that
defeats coverage for which the
insuret has received valuable
considetation.
The court, in Bennett, refused the
argnment that such public policy does
not apply to UIM because it lacks the
protection of a statutory mandate, and
said:
\7e disagree. The purpose of
underinsured motorist coverâge
is to provide a source of indem-
nifìcation for accident victims
when the tortfeasor does not
provide âdequate indemnifica-
tion. The public policy expressed
in Brdun, and in the eadier cases
cited above, favors adequate
compensation for accident vic-
tjms. The absence of a statutory
requirement is irrelevant, for the
public poJicy considerations that
invalidate contractual "anti-stack-
ing2' provisions in an uninsured
motorìst endotsement also sup-
port invalidating those provi-
sions in an underinsured
motorìst endorsement.so
Finally, the coutt rejected the
insurer's assertion that Bennetts had
no reasonable expectation of stacking
their UIM coverâges by citing the
court's ptevious fìnding of violation
of reasonable expectations in
Transamerica ø. Royle. There, the
court invalidated a farntTy exclusion on
the gtound That"it did not honot the
reasonable expectations of the in-
sured."s1 Simply stated, Montana has
judiciaþ tecognized public policy that
favors adequate comPensation fot
accident victims. The insurets use of a
step-dowrì family exclusion in UIM
coverage must not run afoul of that
public policy.
It appears that the use of step-
down provisions is i¡creasing, leaving
insureds in the pedlous position of not
understanding that they only carry
minìmum limits in certam crrcum-
stances. If the trend continues, and it
v¡ill unless the courts intetvene, even
insurance consumers skilled enough to
understand the import of the step-
down clauses may not have full cover-
age alternatives in the mârket. As unfair
as this sounds, insuters will atgue that
their premiums reflect the teduced risk
that the step-do$/n clauses supposedly
provide.s2 That argr,rment is highly
suspect and will Jikeþ tequire counsel
undertake discovery to find whether
there is any actuaÅal basis to that claim.
C. Invalidity because of
ambiguity
Insurance contfacts âre contrâcts
of adhesion. Consequently, in cases of
ambiguiry these contracts âre con-
strued against the dtaftìng insurer,
They are deemed ambiguous if, when
taken as a whole 
- 
in wording and
phraseology 
- 
they ate subject to two
different interpretations.s3 Undet Mon-
tanalaw, the test for intetpreting an
ambþous insurance contrâct is not
what the insurer meant the words of
the policy to meân but what a teason-
able person in the position of the i¡-
sured would understand the wotds to
mean. Flence, the determination te-
quires examination of language utilized
from the viewpoint of the consumer
of avetage i¡¡slligence, not trained in
law or in insutance business.sa Iü/hile
the policy is to be construed lìberally in
favor of the insured ¿nd in favor of
extending coverage,ss exclusions from
insurance coverage are to be narrowly
and strictly consttued.s6
The court in Hardy a. Progres-
sioe Speciahy Insurnnce Co.,s1
(2003) said:
From a consumer's point of
view, a declarations page may be
his or her only plain and simple
source of infotmation and, if
misleading, is of no value. Â
declarations page which sug-
gests coverage in an amount
which is not âctuâlly available is
misleading.
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In Sbook a. State Farm Mwt.
Ins., Judge Hatfìelcl ruled that farnily
step-down clause invalid on a fìnding
that the policy was ambþous given
the posiuoning of the exclusion in
relation to the broad language of
the basic coverâge ag,reement. He
coupled that iìnding with a finding
that the insurer's teading of the poJicy
violated the reasonable expectations of
the insured. The Montana Supreme
Court in ¡he Liebrand and Cole cases
declared the step-down provisions
"uncleat and ambrguous," holding
them invalid and unenfotceable.
Sbook appeared to recognize
structural ambiguiry in insurance poJi-
cies, saying: 'lWhjle the court is not
petsuaded by the argument of struc-
tutal ambiguity presented by Shook, it
does agree that the positioning of the
exclusion, in relation to the general
coverâge provision, lends itself to the
creation of the ambiguity in the exclu-
sion," The court cited with approval
the Aitzona court's test for structural
ambiguity:
fl]he Arizonâ court established
three rules telative to the deter-
mination of v¡hether â structural
ambiguity rendered a policy
unenforceable:
(1) Although the provisions in
question were unambþous by
themselves, the average con-
sumef attempting to check on
his or her rights could not
readily understand them because
of ther location in the policy;
(2) The provision in question
could be deemed unexpected or
one that emasculated 
^ppa;tent
coverage; and
(3) The ptovision may well have
undetcut the putpose of the
ttansaction or even the dickered
deal between the insureds and
the insurer.ss
While ambiguity is in the eye of
the court, it seems hard to 'tmagule a
step-down family exclusion that would
not be violative of at least (2) and (3)
above.
A California court in Haynes ø.
Førtners Insurance Excb ange,se
(2004) held Mid-Century's step-down
clause for petmissive drivers to be
structurally ambþous when attempt-
ing to interpret the declarations page,
basic i¡suring âgreement, limitation of
JiabiJity clause, othet insurance clause,
and amendatoty endorsements affect-
ing those clauses.
Liebrand o. National Farmers
Union Property and Cøsuølty Co,
and Cole a. Truck Ins. Exchange,
were both decided on ambiguity. The
coutt specifìcally noted that the step-
down clause limiting famìly member
recovery to the limits of the Financial
Responsibility laws left one unschooled
in the l¿w with no wây to know the
amount of benefìts available to the
insured's family members. However,
other courts in l(ansas n Brooks o.
Bennetfo (2001) and Iowa in Krause
v. Krduse,6l have held that use of the
genetic phrase "Financial Responsibil-
ity Law" does not render the clause
unclear and ambþous.
In Krause, the Supreme Court of
Iowa found the step-down family ex-
clusions to be cleat and unambþous
whete the clause tefetenced "the limit
specified in the fìnancial responsibility
law" of the state instead of a specific
dollar amount. "Íhe Krause case fea-
tured â full family exclusion clause in
the Bodily Injury coverage, which
blocked Debra I(rause from recovering
^ny 
p^tL of a $1.,284,456 default judge-
ment for her sevete petsonal injudes
caused by her husband's negligcnce in
operating the automobile in which she
wâs a passenger. She then made a clakn
against the policy's Uninsured Motorist
coverage. However, a step-down family
exclusion to the UM coverage limited
her recovery to the state's minimum
limits under the fìnancial responsibi-lity
law ($20,000) instead of the $100,000/
$300,000 limits of the declarations
page. The coutt noted that it had
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pteviously ruled the family exclusion
valid and not violative of pubJic policy.
Consequently, it overturned the tdal
court's fìnding that the clause was
ambiguous. The endorsement in
Krause actually provided that, if there
was no BI coverage because of the
family exclusion, and a famúy member
made a UM claim, then the UM limit
avatlable was stepped down to the
minimum required undet the Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility law
The court found that the language was
not ambþous even though it con-
ceded the failure to stâte a dollar limit
wâs "vague," holding that there could
only be one interpretation of the
clause, and that was the insuter's.
D. Invalidity for violating the
insuredts reasonable expectâtions
The Krause court also found that
Debta I(rause had no reasonable ex-
pectation of covetage. However, the
prerequisites to fìnding violation of the
consumer's reasonable expectations in
Iowa are that the docttine "can only be
invoked when an exclusion (1) is bi-
z rte or oppressive, (2) eviscerates
terms explicitly agreed to, or (3) eJimi-
nates the dominant purpose of the
corìtract." The court found none of
these condit-ions were met in IMT's
desþ of the policy. Nevertheless, it
v¡ould be hard to imagine that when
Krauses purchased 100,000/300,000
limits of BI and UM coverage, they
envisioned theit family members would
receive $0 under the BI and $20,000
under the UM.
The court n Sbook assumed that
the reasonable expectations doctrine
may be used in Montana to resolve
ambiguities.ó2 Howevet, it is also im-
portant to note that the coutt in
Trønsatnericø a. Royle invalidated the
household exclusion because the clause
"failed to honor the reasonable expec-
tations of the purchaser of the policy."63
The court n Royle did not find any
ambiguity, and the author's belief is
that the Montana Supreme Court does
not require ambiguity as a precondition
for voiding a clause for violating rea-
sonable expectations of the insured.Ga
'\s the Missouri coutt said in
Husch ø. Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co.6s
\Øhen purchasing uninsured
motorist coverâge, policyholders
are primariþ concerned with
protecting themselves, their
spouses, and their minot chil-
dren, i.e. the natural family unit.
Minoi children ate unable to
insute themselves and thus pro-
vide financial ptotection against
disabJing injuries.
A step-down clause defeats that
primary concern and sureþ violates the
insured's reasonable expectations. The
I(entucky Supreme Coutt in Leuis a.
'West Americdn Ins. Co.,6ó said:
Consumers purchase liabiliry
insurance covetage in excess of
the mandatory amounts re-
quired by law out of a sense of
petsonal, financial, and social
responsibility. By purchasing
higher liabiliry insurance limits,
the insured provides a method
to compensâte those injuted as a
result of the insured's negli-
gence without endangering the
financiaL security earned by yeats
of hard work. Purchasers of
automobile insurance expect
their family members to receive
comparable protection to that
afforded to unknown third pet-
sons. Family exclusions defeat
these goals and render tiability
insurance coverage illusory for
those persons the insured most
desires to protect, who are also
the persons most likely to be
passengers in the insured's
vehicle, the insured's loved ones,
In Lewis a. Vest Americdn Ins.
Co., the Supreme Court of Kentucky
was asked to apply the modified family
exclusion to deny liability coverâge ovet
the mandatory minimum $25,000. The
case involved a nine-yeat-old gid who
had been brain damaged. She was a
passenget when a car driven by her
mothet collided with a trâctor-trailer.
The coutt invalidated the family exclu-
sion outright, noting that, just as fraud
and collusion had not justified the
guest statutes and family immunity tort
statutes, they did not justify the family
exclusion in auto liabüity policies. The
reasoning in LectJis is so compelling
that it deserves quoting at length:
'\s a result, an insurance policy
containing such a clause pre-
veflts â specifìc class of inno-
cent victims from receiving
adequate financial protection,
This exclusion is entirely based
upon the petson's stâtus âs a
member of the named insured's
family. Without documentâtion
ot facrual basis, every member
of this excluded class is labeled
high risk and branded as being
more likeþ to engage in collu-
sion and fraud.
Tlne Leatis court quoted the
ìíashington Supteme Court reâsoning
n Mutual of Enurncløw Ins. Co. o.
'Wiscomb:67
This exclusion becomes particu-
larþ diétutbing when viewed in
light of the fact that this class
of victims is the one most fre-
quently exposed to the potential
negligence of the named in-
sured. Typical family telations
require family members to ride
togethet on the way to v/ork,
church, school, social functions,
or family outings. Consequendy,
there is no pract-ical method by
which the class of persons ex-
cluded from protection by this
provision may conform their
activities so as to avoid exposute
to the dsk of riding with
someone who, as to them, is
uninsured.
The court went on to say:68
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Many of the people denied in-
surance coverâge ate innocent
children who have no say about
the vehicle in which they are
placed, who drives the vehicle, ot
the mannet in which the vehicle
is driven. Furthermore, because
of their tender yeats, in many
cases they are incapable of fraud
or collusion. Despite these consid-
erations, family exclusion clauses
deny them the full protection
ptovided by insurance policies.
As the author has said before,
"The poJicies being contracts of adhe-
sion, the consumers have no choice and
mây not avoid being exposed to, the
risk of riding with a farniTy member
who is, as to them, uninsured.or
underinsured while being fully insured
as to neighbors and strangers."óe
In Transamerica o, Royle, tl'e
court, after ruling the household exclu-
sion invalid for violation of the Manda-
tory Liability Protection Act, added
that it also v¡¿s invalid due to "its fail-
ure to 'honor the reasonable expecta-
tions' of the purchaser of the poJicy."
The court n Royle quoted Professor
I(eeton's famous underpinning fot the
teasonable expectations doctrine:7o
The objectiveþ reasonable ex-
pectations of applicants and
intended beneficiaries regarding
the terms of insurance contrâcts
will be honored even though
painstaking study of the poìicy
ptovisions v¡ould have negated
those expectatiorìs."
As the Fedetal Court in Montana
said in Sbooh, "The objectively reason-
able expectations of the purchaser are
'honored fin Montana] notwithstanding
the fact that a "painstaking study" of
the policy would [negate] those expec-
tations."Tr In Sbooh, the court found
the State Farm step-down family exclu-
sion to the Bodily Injury Liability Cov-
erâge to be ambþous because a
reasonable insured might read the
exclusion, "There is no coverage . . .
2, For,\ny Bodiþ hiary toi . . . c. anJ
ìnsøred or any member of tlte insøredJ
family tesiding in the insared'¡ house-
hold. . .", to meân no indemnifìcation
or defense to an insured or family
member who is sued. The insutet ar-
gued it could only mean the insured
could not make a claim for injury under
the coverage. Having found the provi-
sion ambþous, the court subjected it
to the reasonable expectations test. It
noted that the exclusion vras sepaiated
"both in space and relation" ftom the
broad basic insurìng agreement, which
promised that State Farm would "[P]ay
damages fot wtrich an in¡øred becomes
Iegaþ liable to pay because of: a. bodiþ
i{ar1 to others," and therefore, violated
the insured's reasonable expectaúons.
In the Arizona case of Aaerett a.
Farmers Ins. Co.,72 the court over-
tutned a summary judgment for the
insuret that reljed on a farnily exclusion
to the liability coverage and temanded
the case for l¡rial. The Averett children
were seriously injured passengers in an
accident in which their mother, who
was driving, w¿s killed. Their father
had ordered from the agent, "full cov-
eràge" for his entìre family, and the
agent sold him $250,000 per person
limits of BI coverage, subject to â step-
down family exclusion that reduced the
children's recovery to minimum man-
datory $15,000 âpiece. The Atizona
court set out four situations in which
it would not enforce such exclusions,
even if unambþous, if they violated
the customet's reasonable expecta-
tions.73 Those were: (1) where the
unambþoug poJicy term cannot be
understood by the reasonably intelli-
gent consumer; (2) where there is inad-
equate notice of a tetm that is unusual,
unexpected or that emasculates appar-
ent coverâge; (3) where conduct of the
insurer would "create an objective
impression of coverage in the mind of
a reasonable insured"; and, (4) where
activity of the insurer has induced the
reason¿ble belief in coverage, though
"expressly and unambþously denied
by the policy."
E. Unconscionability
UnconscionabiJìty appears to be
a viable approach to âttâcking step-
down provisions in Montana given the
court's dicta in the cases of Liebrand
a. Nøtional Farmers Union Property
and Casuahy Co., and Cole v. Truck
Ins, Exchange, discussed above. As
the court satdn luen a. U.S,'Vest
Direct:14
fflot such contracts to be
enforced against the weaker
bargaining pârty, they must pass
â two-prong test for validity. \üe
stated that test âs follows;
For such a contrâct ot clause to
be void, it must fall within iudi-
ciaþ imposed limits of enforce-
ment. It v/ill not be enforced
against the weaker pârty \ /hen it
is: (1) not within the reasonable
expectations of said parr¡, or Q)
within the teasonable expecta-
tions of the party, but, when
considered in its context, is un-
duly opptessive, unconscionable
or against pubJic policy.
***
UnconscionabiJity tequites â two-
fold determination:
That the contractual terms âre
unreasonably favorable to the
drafter and that thete is no
meaningful choice on the part
of the other party regarding
acceptance of the provisions.Ts
In invalidating the family step-
down clause in USAlfs policy in
Topp a. United Seraices Autotnobile
Association reported above, Judge
Mcl(ittrick also expressly held the step-
down clauses in the liability coverage
of USÁ,\ auto policy to be unconscio-
nable. He noted the deposition testi-
mony of USAÂs officer that (a) the
exclusion clause was patt of a standard
agreement; Q) that Topps were unable
to negotiate the agreement; and (3) that
the insured's only choice was to âccept
or reject the agreement.
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Conclusion
Step,down clauses that reduce
the recovery of family members to
mililmum limits and prorecrion of
permissive users to minimum limjts are
subject to challenge fot being unfaiq
unconscionable, violative of pubJic
polic¡ violative of reasonable expecta-
tions, and for creating ambiguity in an
auto policy. They only impact those
insureds who, for their own security,
elected to cârry more than the minì-
mum limits of auto insurance. Yet, with
tegard to the affected coverage, the
secutity conscious insured is no better
off than the insuted who chose mi¡i-
mum limits. It is unlikely that any such
insuted would buy a poJicy with step-
down provision if the insurance agent
told them that the poJicy would provide
their family or permissive user less
insurance than they are buying fot
others. Moreover, the pdmaty justifìca-
tions fot the family exclusion are those
iong ago rejected by the courts in abro-
gaitng intta-family torr immuruty. The
clauses aùtttratly exclude from cover-
age alatge class of persons most likely
to be tiding in the insured vehicles.
Nevertheless, it is ironic that insur-
ers are increas.ingly insetting step-down
clauses into the BI, UM, and UIM
coverages on poJicies issued in Mon-
tana. The ptovisions are vulnetable to
âttack on several valid grounds and
need to be sctutinized by the Montana
Supreme Court.
It is hard see rhe justifìcation for
the family step-down provisions. The
seemingly ranonal jusrification for the
permissive user step-down is that the
insurer has no way of knowing who
will be ddving for putposes of calculat-
ing risk. But, based on previous year,s
experience, the auto insurer can predict
to a reasonable degree o{ accwtacy
what its losses will be this yeat by rca-
son of negligence of permissive uscrs.
The insurer also does not know which
autos will be in accidents next year, but
it can predict with high accuracy how
many will be and what the dollar losses
will be.
-r\s always, success w.ill come ftom
well honed arguments and btiefs that
expose the fallacies and unfairness
behind step-down clauses. It will
be interesting to see which, if any,
Montana auto irìsurers are willing to
risk an appeal on the clauses. The sad
pârt is that the clauses Jikely reduce
benefìts to many an untepresented
family member or victim of a petmis-
sive insured's negligence. fnsurance
enforcement is a never-ending and
always-neces s ary task.
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